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Abstract
We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze
the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs.
We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative
game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-
empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that
consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)),
but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, consolidation of distribution centers (DCs) has turned out to be
an excellent strategy in global logistics management. One of the explanations that is often
cited to rationalize its rate of success is the reduction of facility and inventory costs that
comes with the consolidation and centralization of distribution operations.
Facility location problems as well as inventory control have each been studied exten-
sively, but separately, in a large literature. In fact, in several studies on facility location
problems the demands processes are often (quite unrealistically) oversimplified for the
sake of tractability. On the other hand, in the literature on inventory control there has
not been much integration of other supply chain activities until recently. We refer the
reader to Teo et al. (2001) for an overview on papers in which both lines of research do
meet.
As a matter of fact, in the paper mentioned above both aspects are dealt with simul-
taneously. The paper can thus be viewed as a study of a facility location model that
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captures the impact of the inventory related costs with more sophistication. In fact, Teo
et al. (2001) allow for stochastic demands at the customer locations, which brings along
the analytical problem of not having at hand closed form expressions for the optimal
inventory costs for most demand distributions. As they pointed out, their analysis was
facilitated in a great deal by recent advances in the area of stochastic inventory theory,
mainly due to the papers by Zheng (1992) and Gallego (1998).
In the location-inventory problem that Teo et al. (2001) study there is a firm with a
production plant producing a single product for a collection of aggregated demand points
(customers). There are a number of possible locations to set up regional distribution
centers, from which the customers are to be served. The main problem the firm faces
is to choose the locations so as to minimize total facility and inventory costs. Some
assumptions (indifference of the customers with respect to the DCs and constant outbound
transportation costs) are made to isolate the effect of ordering costs and replenishment
leadtimes on the consolidation strategy. One of their main results is that consolidation
leads to lower facility investment and inventory costs if the demands are identically and
independently distributed.
In this paper, we study the location-inventory problem described above and build on
several results provided by Zheng (1992) and Teo et al. (2001) to extend the profitability
result in the latter work. Our main result says that the minimal total costs (which
correspond to the consolidation into a central DC) can also be divided in a stable way
among the DC locations. There are (at least) two possible interpretations of the existence
of a stable allocation of the minimal total costs. In the first place, it means that there is a
way to divide the costs so that no set of DC locations can protest against the consolidation
strategy arguing that they could take care of their own customers at less costs. Another
interpretation is possible if we assume that the DCs have already been set up. In this
case the set up costs, which are amortized over time, can be reinterpreted as being the
costs involved in running a DC. The existence of a stable cost allocation then implies that
costs can be divided in such a way that no set of DC locations can object against the firm
centralizing its DCs into one central DC.
The allocation of costs is one of the main issues that are addressed in cooperative game
theory. Cooperative game theory deals with situations involving several agents who can
benefit from cooperation. Establishing a relation between location-inventory problems and
cooperative games then enables us to apply cooperative game theory to study the existence
of core allocations, i.e., stable cost allocations. Not surprisingly, cooperative game theory
has been invoked before for the same reason in several other studies on inventory problems.
Cooperative games associated with news-vendor situations were studied in Hartman et
al. (2000), Slikker et al. (2001), and Mu¨ller et al. (2002). The last two of these papers
independently established the existence of stable allocations in news-vendor situations.
Moreover, they provided conditions under which news-vendor games are convex. Thus
they neatly complement the results of Gerchak and Gupta (1991), Robinson (1993), and
Hartman and Dror (1996) on allocation rules in continuous review single period inventory
systems with complete back-ordering. Meca et al. (1999) studied cooperative games
associated with inventory situations with deterministic demand processes. They focus
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on the information that is revealed by the companies and proportional cost allocation
mechanisms. Finally, Borm et al. (2001) recently provided a survey of cooperative games
associated with operations research situations. They focus on five different natures of the
underlying optimization problem, one of which being ‘inventory’.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 with some pre-
liminaries on the stochastic (Q, r)-model and cooperative game theory. Then, in Section
3, we recall the location-inventory model of Teo et al. (2001), and introduce the class of
associated DC consolidation games. In Section 4 we present our result on the balanced-
ness of DC consolidation games in case the demands are identically and independently
distributed.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some concepts and definitions of (Q, r)-policies and cooperative
game theory.
The location-inventory model that we consider includes an order quantity/reorder
point system, i.e., a (Q, r)-system. More precisely, we study a single-item continuous-
review inventory system, where stochastic demands arrive at mean rate µ per unit time.
Replenishment orders are delivered after a positive fixed leadtime L. All stockouts are
backordered. The inventory costs consist of an ordering cost k(Q) per order, Q being
the ordering size, and proportional inventory holding (penalty) costs accumulating at a
constant rate h (p) per unit stock (backorder) per unit time. The ordering cost k(Q)
is modeled as a piece-wise linear concave increasing function of the ordering size Q to
account for the economies of scale in purchasing and transportation. We concentrate on
minimizing the long run average total costs per unit time.
Under mild conditions on the stochastic demand (see Serfozo and Stidham (1982) and
Browne and Zipkin (1991) for detailed discussions) the long run average total costs per
unit time takes the following form:
C(Q, r) = C(Q, r, µ) =
µk(Q) +
∫ r+Q
r
G(y)dy
Q
for all Q, r > 0, (1)
where G(y) is the rate at which the expected inventory costs accumulate at time t + L
when the inventory position at time t equals y ∈ IR, i.e.,1
G(y) = E(h(y −D)+ + p(D − y)+),
D being the sum of demands that occur during the time interval (t, t + L]. The term
λk(Q)
Q
in (1) reflects the average ordering cost. The other term,
∫ r+Q
r G(y,µ)dy
Q
, reflects the
average holding and stockout cost of the system, as the inventory level can be shown to
be uniformly distributed between r and r +Q (cf. Zheng (1992)).
1For x ∈ IR we write x+ = max{0, x}.
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The following (technical) results are due to Zheng (1992) and facilitate much of our
analysis later on. Define
r(Q) := argminr
∫ r+Q
r
G(y)dy for all Q > 0.
Then, r(Q) is the optimal reorder point when the order quantity is fixed at Q. Zheng
(1992) showed that
G(r(Q)) = G(r(Q) +Q) for all Q > 0.
Moreover, he proved that the functions H and S defined by
H(Q) :=
{
minyG(y) if Q = 0;
G(r(Q)) if Q > 0,
and
S(Q) :=
{
0 if Q = 0;∫ r(Q)+Q
r(Q)
G(y)dy =
∫ Q
0
H(y)dy if Q > 0,
are both convex in Q. Hence, using S(0) = 0, we have that
S(αQ) ≤ αS(Q) for all Q > 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (2)
The other ingredient of this paper is cooperative game theory of which we recall the
necessary basic definitions below. A cooperative (cost) game with transferable utility
(game, for short) is a pair (N, c), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the player set and c the
characteristic function, which assigns to every subset S ⊆ N a value c(S), with c(∅) = 0.
The number c(S) represents the minimal costs for coalition S when all its members decide
to cooperate. The subgames of (N, c) are the games (S, c|S) where S ⊆ N and c|S : S → IR
is the restriction of the map c to the coalition S.
Cooperative game theory focuses on fair division rules for the value of c(N) of the
grand coalition. A core allocation x = (xi)i∈N ∈ IRN divides the value c(N) among the
players in such a way that no coalition has an incentive to split off, i.e.,
x(N) = c(N) and x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N,
where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for all S ⊆ N . The core Core(N, c) is the (possibly empty) set of
core allocations.
A map λ : 2N\{∅} → [0, 1] is called balanced if for all i ∈ N it holds that∑S⊆N :i∈S λ(S) =
1. A cost game (N, c) is called balanced if for each balanced map λ we have∑
S⊆N
λ(S)c(S) ≥ c(N).
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Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) proved2 independently that non-emptiness of the
core and balancedness of a game are equivalent, i.e., for a game (N, c) we have
Core(N, c) 6= ∅ ⇔ (N, c) is balanced.
A game is called totally balanced if all its subgames are balanced.
3 The model
In this section we recall the location-inventory problem as defined by Teo et al. (2001).
Moreover, we introduce the class of consolidation games which are cost games associated
with the location-inventory problems.
In the location-inventory problem, there is a set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of demand points.
We assume that the demand for the product at demand point j can be modeled by a
continuous stochastic process {dj(t) : t ≥ 0}, with mean rate µj per unit time.
The demands are to be served by n possible distribution centers, which are indexed
by 1, . . . , n. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of possible DC locations. We assume that
the demand points (i.e., customers) are indifferent about where their orders are shipped
from, and also that the outbound transportation costs do not depend on where the orders
are shipped from. We assume that initially each DC i is to serve aggregate demand∑
j∈M x
0
ijdj(t), where the (x
0
ij)i∈N,j∈M satisfy x
0
ij ∈ {0, 1} (i ∈ N, j ∈M) and
∑n
i=1 x
0
ij = 1
(j ∈M). So, the demands at each demand point are exclusively served from a single DC.
A group (coalition) S ⊆ N of distribution centers may decide to cooperate and re-
assign the initial demands within the coalition. A demand re-assignment for S is a matrix
XS = (xSij)i∈S,j∈M that satisfies x
S
ij ∈ {0, 1} (i ∈ S, j ∈ M) and
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈M x
S
ij =∑
i∈S
∑
j∈M x
0
ij. Let Π
S be the set of demand re-assignments for S. If for a given demand
re-assignment XS it holds that XSi :=
∑m
j=1 xij > 0, then DC i is set up for which it
incurs a fixed setup cost fi. We assume that fi is a per unit time charge, which then
also could be treated as and/or include the direct variable costs in running a DC. Let Li
be the leadtime to supply from the plant to DC i. The inventory costs at DC i include
an ordering cost ki(Q) per order, Q being the ordering size, and proportional inventory
holding (penalty) costs accumulating at a constant rate hi (pi) per unit stock (backorder)
per unit time. The ordering cost ki(Q) is modeled as a piece-wise linear concave increasing
function of the ordering size Q to account for the economies of scale in purchasing and
transportation.
If a coalition S ⊆ N of distribution centers decides to cooperate, i.e., re-assign the
initial demand within S to minimize costs, then it follows readily that the optimal long
2In fact, Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) proved that a cost savings game (N, v) is balanced
(i.e., there is an allocation x = (xi)i∈N ∈ IRN such that x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N with equality for
S = N) if and only if for each balanced map λ we have
∑
S⊆N λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N). This is easily shown to
be equivalent with the above statement.
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run average costs for S equal
c(S) := min
XS∈ΠS
{∑
i∈S
[
fiχ(x
S
i > 0) + min
r,Q
C(r,Q,
∑
j∈M
xSijµj)
]}
,
where χ is the indicator function and C the cost function as defined in (1).
4 Balancedness
In this section we restrict ourselves to identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.)
demand processes. We prove that the associated consolidation games are balanced, i.e.,
allow for stable divisions of the joint costs.
Since demands are i.i.d. we can assume without loss of generality that µj = 1 for
all demand points j ∈ M . Let ni := x0i =
∑
j∈M x
0
ij be the aggregate demand that
originally would be served by DC i ∈ N . Define nS :=
∑
i∈S ni for all S ⊆ N . Recall that
x0ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N, j ∈M , so that nS ∈ IN for all S ⊆ N . Note that nN = m.
Let us now consider the (Q, r)-system that corresponds to a distribution center that
serves a set M ′ ⊆M of demand points. Since the demand points are i.i.d. we can define
G(y,m′) as the rate at which the expected inventory costs accumulate at time t+L when
the inventory position at time t. The next result is due to Teo et al. (2001) (page 102).
Lemma 4.1 (Teo et al. (2001)) For all y ∈ IR and 0 ≤ m′ ≤ m we have m′
m
G(y,m) ≤
G(m
′
m
y,m′).
Theorem 4.2 Consolidation games have a non-empty core when the demand processes
are i.i.d..
Proof. Let λ : 2N\{∅} → [0, 1] be a balanced map.
Let S ⊆ N . From Theorem 1 in Teo et al. (2001) we know that an optimal strategy
for coalition S is consolidation at some DC in S, say iS.
Consider the strategy for the grand coalition in which with probability λ(S) nS
nN
(S ⊆
N) consolidation at iS takes place. Equivalently, a DC i ∈ N is picked with probability∑
S⊆N :i=iS λ(S)
nS
nN
. Note that
∑
S⊆N λ(S)
nS
nN
= 1
nN
∑
S⊆N λ(S)nS =
1
nN
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈S λ(S)ni =
1
nN
∑
i∈N
∑
S:i∈S λ(S)ni =
1
nN
∑
i∈N ni
∑
S:i∈S λ(S) =
1
nN
∑
i∈N ni = 1.
Since this strategy is a weighted average of (pure) consolidation strategies, the asso-
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ciated costs majorize the optimal costs of the grand coalition. Hence,
c(N) ≤
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
nS
nN
[
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nN +
∫ r+Q
r
GiS(y, nN)dy
Q
]
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
nS
nN
fiS +min
r,Q
nS
nN
kiS(Q)nN +
∫ r+Q
r
GiS(y, nN)dy
Q
]
≤
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
fiS +min
r,Q
nS
nN
kiS(Q)nN +
∫ r+Q
r
GiS(y, nN)dy
Q
]
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nS +
∫ r+Q
r
nS
nN
GiS(y, nN)dy
Q
]
≤
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nS +
∫ r+Q
r
GiS(
nS
nN
y, nS)dy
Q
]
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nS +
nN
nS
∫ nS(r+Q)/nN
nSr/nN
GiS(
nS
nN
y, nS)dy
Q

=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nS +
nN
nS
∫ r+nSQ/nN
r
GiS(
nS
nN
y, nS)dy
Q
]
≤
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
fiS +min
r,Q
kiS(Q)nS +
∫ r+Q
r
GiS(y, nS)dy
Q
]
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)c(S).
The third inequality follows from Lemma 4.1 with m′ = nS. The last inequality follows
from (2) with α = nS
nN
. The last equality follows from the optimality for S to consolidate
into DC iS.
We conclude that the consolidation game is balanced and hence, using the result by
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967), that it has a non-empty core. 2
There are (at least) two possible interpretations of Theorem 4.2. In the first place, it
means that there is a way to divide the minimal total costs so that no set of DC locations
can protest against the consolidation strategy arguing that they could take care of their
own customers at less costs. Another interpretation is possible if we assume that the DCs
have already been set up. In this case the set up costs, which are amortized over time, can
be reinterpreted as being the costs involved in running a DC. The existence of a stable
cost allocation then implies that costs can be divided in such a way that no set of DC
locations can object against the firm centralizing its DCs into one central DC.
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The following result follows immediately by noting that a subgame (S, c|S) of a consol-
idation game (N, c) is again a consolidation game, associated with the original location-
inventory problem restricted to S.
Corollary 4.3 Every consolidation game is totally balanced when the demand processes
are i.i.d..
References
Bondareva, O.N. (1963). “Some Applications of the Methods of Linear Programming to
the Theory of Cooperative Games,” (in Russian) Problemy Kibernetiki, 10, 119-139.
Borm, P., Hamers, H., and Hendrickx, R. (2001). “Operations Research Games: A
Survey,” TOP, 9, 139-198.
Browne, S. and Zipkin, P. (1991). “Inventory Models with Continuous, Stochastic De-
mands,” Annals of Applied Probability, 1, 419-435.
Gallego G. (1998). “New Bounds and Heuristics for (Q, r) Policies,” Management Sci-
ence, 44, 219-233.
Gerchak, Y. and Gupta, D. (1991). “Technical Note: On Apportioning Costs to Cus-
tomers in Centralized Continuous Review Inventory Systems,” Journal of Operations
Management, 10, 546-551.
Hartman, B.C. and Dror, M. (1996). “Cost Allocation in Continuous Review Inven-
tory Models,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 43, 549-561.
Hartman, B.C., Dror, M., and Shaked, M. (2000). “Cores of Inventory Centralization
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 31, 26-49.
Meca, A., Timmer, J., Garc´ıa-Jurado, I., and Borm, P. (1999). “Inventory Games,”
CentER Discussion Paper 9953, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. To appear
in European Journal of Operational Research.
Mu¨ller, A., Scarsini M., and Shaked M. (2002). “The Newsvendor Game has a non-
empty Core,” Games and Economic Behavior, 38, 118-126.
Robinson, L. (1993). “A Comment on Gerchak and Gupta’s: On Apportioning Costs
to Customers in Centralized Continuous Review Inventory Systems,” Journal of Opera-
tions Management, 11, 99-102.
Serfozo, R. and Stidham, S. (1982). “Semi-Stationary Clearing Processes,” Stochastic
8
Process and Applications, 6, 165-178.
Shapley, L.S. (1967). “On Balanced Sets and Cores,” Naval Research Logistics Quar-
terly, 14, 453-460.
Slikker, M., Fransoo, J., and Wouters, M. (2001). “Joint Ordering in Multiple News-
Vendor Problems: A Game-Theoretical Approach,” Beta Working Paper WP-64, Depart-
ment of Technology Management, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The
Netherlands.
Teo, C.P., Ou J., and Goh, M. (2001). “Impact on Inventory Costs with Consolida-
tion of Distribution Centers,” IIE Transactions, 33, 99-110.
Zheng Y.S. (1992). “On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems,” Management Sci-
ence, 38, 87-103.
9
